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Abstract 
 
Criminal lawyers and criminologists often refer to contemporary society as the 
risk society, dominated by an awareness and fear of risks that threaten security: 
for instance, terrorist attacks. Governments respond to this fear by taking 
measures that prevent such risks as much as possible. This has led to the 
development of a concomitant change to preventive criminal justice, illustrated 
most prominently with regard to recent anti-terrorism legislation. There is 
much debate in criminal law circles, engaging both scholars and politicians, on 
the need for preventive criminal law. Different points of view are expressed. 
Often, the framework against which preventive criminal law is assessed is 
human rights law: in European circles, the European Convention for the Protect 
of Human Rights. In this paper, we opt for a different approach: preventive 
criminal justice is evaluated on the basis of the precautionary principle. 
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1 Introduction 
 
It is a more or less established fact that we live in a risk society, a notion that 
is supported by references to sociological and criminological studies. 
Frequently mentioned studies are Risk Society by Ulrich Beck and The 
Culture of Control by David Garland.1 While these two studies have laid the 
groundwork for the study of criminal justice in current society, their line of 
argument varies considerably. Beck’s argument essentially entails that 
technological innovations have occurred so rapidly in society that they have 
given rise to uncontrollable risks. Because of this, the modernisation process 
not only results in an increase in prosperity but is characterised at the time 
by threats that are the product of human hands. Consequently, contemporary 
society is, on the one hand, focused on controlling and managing the risks 
and, on the other hand, spreading the risks across the societal actors. Beck 
had in mind mainly ecological developments and the stability of financial 
markets, although he subsequently related his (world) risk society explicitly 
to the threat of terrorist attacks as well.2 Beck barely deals with criminal law. 
Garland, however, does. His analysis is intended as an explanation for a 
radical change in ideas on the approach to crime. A multiplicity of 
developments have led to loss of the perspective in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, on which Garland focuses, in which ‘real’ solutions are 
sought for crime; for example, by placing a strong accent on resocialisation 
and an improvement in socio-economic conditions. Most of the attention is 
now paid to controlling crime and the risks of crime. The use of criminal law 
as an instrument to control safety risks has become part of an all-
encompassing culture of control. 
 What connects these and related studies is that they map out diverse 
social, legal, economic, and political developments that are the cause or 
possible explanation of the fact that in modern times the central notion is the 
protection of citizens against all manner of dangers. 3 This means that the use 
and desirability of preventive action is placed in the foreground, where it 
also concerns criminal law.4 This development is ‘foreign’ to the system in a 
certain sense. After all, criminal law proceeds from the standard model in 
                                                     
1
 U. Beck, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage 1992, reprint 
2005); D. Garland, The Culture of Control. Crime and Social Order in 
Contemporary Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2002). 
2
 U. Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat. World Risk Society Revisited’ (2002) 19 Theory, 
Culture & Society 39. 
3
 See for example B. Hudson, Justice in the Risk Society. Challenging and Re-
affirming Justice in Late Modernity (London: Sage 2003), H. Kemshall, 
Understanding Risk in Criminal Justice (Maidenhead: Open University Press 2003) 
and D. Denney, Risk and Society (London: Sage 2005). 
4
 Cf. R. Pieterman, De voorzorgscultuur. Streven naar veiligheid in een wereld vol 
risico en onzekerheid (Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2008) at 122. 
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which action is taken on the basis of harm that has already occurred. The 
background of this is both instrumental and based on the legal protection. On 
the one hand, the repressive approach is based partly on the presumption that 
people are rational actors and are therefore deterred by the threat of the 
penalty that can be imposed if they act in conflict with the rules. On the 
other hand, preventive action entails the risk that – in retrospect – people are 
wrongfully subjected to far-reaching measures.5 Indeed, there are strong 
arguments to be critical of preventive criminal justice, if only from the point 
of legal protection of the suspect. However, there is another side to the latter 
arguments. What if people are shown not to act so rationally that they are 
deterred by the threat of punishment? And does avoidance of the risk of 
‘false positives’ automatically outweigh the misery experienced if action 
cannot be taken in time? Precisely these considerations arise when a serious 
threat is experienced and fear sets in.6 
 
 
2 Definition of the problem and plan of approach 
 
In this paper, we consider the emergence of preventive measures in criminal 
law and the concomitant shift of the scales in the weighing of the interest of 
safety against the interest of legal protection as an established fact. This does 
not mean, however, that this development is considered desirable. There is 
much debate in criminal law circles, engaging both scholars and politicians, 
on the perceived need for preventive criminal law. This issue has been most 
vigorously debated with regard to anti-terrorism legislation. The feature of 
the latter debate is that those who engage in it tend to reason from one 
specific point of view. When legislators adopt counterterrorism measures, 
they assume without giving a further or satisfactory explanation that there 
exists a serious threat of terrorism, which requires preventive action through 
criminal law. This has led to amendments to substantive criminal law and the 
law of criminal procedure. Only reasons that favour such amendments are 
relied upon; scant attention is paid to the disadvantages that attend these 
particular measures. The argumentation pattern of critics of such measures 
concentrates precisely on these disadvantages. Preventive criminal law 
measures are assessed against the human rights framework: the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.7 Taking the whole into 
                                                     
5
 A.M. Dershowitz, Preemption: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company 2006) at 7 and 19.  
6
 Cf. for example W. Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Freiheit und Sicherheit im Angesicht 
terroristischer Anschläge’ (2002) Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 497 at 499. 
7
 An illustration of such an assessment of counterterrorism measures is the recently 
published report ‘Assessing Damage, Urging Action’ by the International 
Commission of Jurists. We endorse many of the points of the analysis in this report. 
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consideration, the image therefore arises of a stratified and polarised debate: 
positions are exchanged, but each of the two strata reasons on the basis of a 
single point of view, that of the expected advantages or the foreseen 
disadvantages. A weighing of interests in such a way that advantages and 
disadvantages are actually viewed in their interrelationship does not take 
place. 
In this paper, we adopt a different point of view. This is not because 
we disagree with the arguments that are raised. What concerns us is the 
question of whether a more integrated assessment of preventive measures is 
possible in order to avoid a stratified and polarised debate as sketched above. 
We wish to explore the extent to which it is possible to arrive at a normative 
assessment of the developments in criminal law on the basis of another 
argument/norm: the precautionary principle. The full extent of this 
assessment could not be included in this paper and has been elaborated 
elsewhere.8 Firstly, since it is impossible to discuss all relevant legislative 
developments in criminal law, we limit ourselves to discussing anti-terrorism 
legislation. Secondly, a limit lies in viewing the precautionary principle in 
the light of Sunstein’s Laws of Fear.9 Thirdly, rather than presenting an all-
encompassing normative framework, we aim to outline some viewpoints that 
are important for a normative assessment of anti-terrorism measures. Our 
main contention is that no proper evaluation is possible without full 
knowledge of the actual threat and the effectiveness of certain measures. 
Only after all arguments pro and contra have been taken into consideration 
can one properly appraise anti-terrorism measures. Our considerations relate 
to the manner of assessment rather than its outcome. 
 We use the following plan of approach. In Section 3, developments 
in the Netherlands relating to counterterrorism legislation are discussed and 
compared to developments in Italy, Germany, England, and the United 
States. This section ends with a list of the common characteristics of the 
legislation in these countries. Section 4 deals with the substance of the 
precautionary principle on the basis of Sunstein’s book and the criticism of 
that principle. From there, partly on the basis of the anti-catastrophe 
principle mentioned by Sunstein, we discuss the meaning of the 
precautionary principle for the fight against terrorism under criminal law. In  
                                                                                                                            
One must, however, note that such findings are somewhat one-sided. Precisely 
because individual rights to liberty are taken as a starting point, the view focuses 
mainly on the disadvantages of counterterrorism policy. The arguments in favour of 
taking preventive measures are not mentioned or are worked out only superficially. 
8
 M.J. Borgers, De vlucht naar voren (The way forward), VU inaugural lecture (The 
Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2007). 
9
 C.R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2005).  
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Section 5 we formulate several viewpoints that may be useful in the 
assessment of anti-terrorism legislation. 
 
 
3 Criminal law and terrorism: developments in and outside the 
Netherlands 
 
3.1 Counterterrorism legislation in the Netherlands 
 
In the 1970s, the Netherlands was faced with terrorism in the form of 
Moluccan actions. The government responded with a policy based on 
dialogue and negotiation. This was known abroad as ‘the Dutch approach’. 
A brief anecdote illustrates how the Dutch attitude towards terror has 
changed. 
 In 1970, when a group of Moluccan youths occupied the official 
residence of the Indonesian ambassador in Wassenaar, Premier Piet De Jong 
and Foreign Affairs Minister Joseph Luns went to Wassenaar. They moved 
into a house opposite the residence, from which they conducted negotiations 
with the hostage takers. At a given moment, they left the house and explored 
the garden of the residence and, as one of them was proudly able to relate 
later, even came within shooting distance of the Moluccans. Luns even tried 
to climb over the iron gate but this action failed. He fell from the gate and 
landed awkwardly.  
 This almost naive manner of fighting terrorism, which otherwise 
ended well – the hostage takers surrendered after a few hours – is not 
representative (for its lack of professionalism) of the whole of the 1970s. In 
later actions, professional negotiators were employed and a crisis centre was 
set up, far from the scene of the disaster. The example nevertheless gives a 
good illustration of the primacy of negotiation.  
 A major difference between fighting terrorism in the 1970s and 
nowadays is that since 11 September 2001, the government has pinned its 
faith on the criminalisation of terrorism. The ‘Dutch approach’ to negotiation 
has faded completely into the background. Islamic terrorism, of course, is 
very different in nature from Moluccan terrorism. The latter was not 
religiously inspired, remained confined to the Netherlands as a movement, 
and did not pursue narrowly defined political goals. But that did not make it 
less dangerous. On the contrary, the Moluccan actions, including two train 
hijackings and the occupation of a primary school, claimed more victims in 
the Netherlands than the Islamic terrorism that has held the world in its grip 
since the attacks on the World Trade Center.  
 What measures has the Dutch legislature introduced since 2001? We 
mention the most striking:  
Firstly, a broadening of criminal liability by criminalising the 
preliminary stage before a harmful act has taken place. The Dutch Terrorism 
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Act (Wet terroristische misdrijven) has resulted in more severe sentences for 
the commission of certain (common) crimes committed with a terrorist 
purpose, criminal conspiracy has been expanded,10 and recruitment for 
‘armed combat’ (i.e. jihad) has become a criminal offence.11 The most recent 
offshoot of the expansion of criminal liability is participation and 
cooperation in setting up a terrorist training camp;12   
Secondly, an expansion of investigatory and prosecutorial power 
with regard to terrorism.13 ‘Indications’ of a terrorist crime are already 
sufficient as a threshold that triggers special investigative powers, while a 
‘reasonable suspicion’ was previously required. Furthermore, pre-trial 
detention is possible on the basis of an ‘ordinary’ suspicion instead of the 
more stringent requirement of ‘incriminating evidence’. This can last until 
the start of the trial, subject to a maximum of 27 months. During that period, 
the accused can be denied access to his file and to incriminating evidence 
against him;  
Thirdly, the possibility to use official notifications from the AIVD 
(General Intelligence and Security Service) as evidence in a criminal case 
and provisions for a special procedure in which an AIVD official can be 
heard by the examining judge as a protected witness;  
Fourthly, the possibility to prohibit terrorist organisations included 
on a UN or EU sanction list, as a result of which assets can be frozen and 
possessions liquidated. Participation in the continuation of the activities of 
such an organisation is punishable by a one-year term of imprisonment. 
 
 
                                                     
10
 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees (Staatsblad) 2004 at 290 and 373. 
11
 For a comprehensive discussion of the ‘Wet Terroristische Misdrijven’, see J.M. 
Lintz, De plaats van de Wet terroristische misdrijven in het materiële strafrecht. Een 
onderzoek naar de wederzijdse beïnvloeding door de Wet terroristische misdrijven 
en het Wetboek van Strafrecht en enkele bijzondere wetten (Nijmegen: WLP 2007). 
See also M.J. Borgers, ‘Strafbaarstellingen in de strijd tegen terrorisme. Werving ten 
behoeve van de gewapende strijd en samenspanning tot terroristische misdrijven’, in 
A.H.E.C. Jordaans and others (eds.), Praktisch strafrecht Liber Amicorum J.M. 
Reijntjes (Nijmegen: WLP 2005) at 25. 
12
 To be included in the new provision 134a Sr. Parliamentary papers II, 2007-2008, 
31 386, nr. 3 at 5. See T. Barkhuysen and others, ‘Mensenrechten-Actualiteiten’ 
(2008) 33 NJCM-Bulletin 554.   
13
 For a discussion, see Borgers, above n. 8, at 44; P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen, 
‘Terrorismebestrijding door marginalisering van strafvorderlijke waarborgen’ (2005) 
80 Nederlands Juristenblad 397; Th. De Roos, ‘Opsporingsbevoegdheden verruimd 
in de strijd tegen terrorisme. De nieuwe wetsvoorstellen helpen niet’ (2006) 86 
Advocatenblad 176; P.A.M. Verrest, Wet ter verruiming van de mogelijkheden tot 
opsporing en vervolging van terroristische misdrijven’(2007) 56 Ars Aequi 158. 
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3.2 Counterterrorism legislation outside the Netherlands 
 
It is clear that these developments in the Netherlands do not stand alone. 
Since 9/11, many countries have taken measures to fight terrorism. We 
outline briefly, by way of random samples, the developments in Italy, 
Germany, the UK and the US. These countries were selected because of the 
mix of common and civil law (the UK and the US v. the Netherlands, 
Germany and Italy) and for their experience or lack of experience with 
fighting terrorism under criminal law before 9/11 (Germany, Italy and the 
UK v. the US and the Netherlands). 
 
3.2.1 Italy 
 
Italy, which had already taken radical measures in the 1960s and 1970s to 
combat domestic terror from both leftists (Brigate Rosse) and rightists (neo-
fascists), passed anti-terrorist legislation after 9/11. Inciting, forming, 
organising, leading, or financing terrorist organisations were made 
punishable.14 Later, in a second set of measures just after the bomb attacks in 
London in 2005, the commission of crimes for terrorist purposes15 and the 
recruitment16 and training of terrorists were added.17 In certain cases, a 
person can be held in preventive custody for five days without an actual 
suspicion, during which time that person may be examined without the 
assistance of a lawyer.18 Strict immigration measures have also been 
adopted: administrative detention and deportation of non-nationals is 
possible if they appear to constitute a threat to national security. In addition, 
                                                     
14
 Art. 270bis: (1) Codice penale: Chiunque promuove, costituisce, organizza o 
dirige o finanzia associazioni che si propongono il compimento di atti di violenza 
con finalità di terrorismo o di eversione dell’ordine democratico (2) è punito con la 
reclusione da sette a quidici anni.  
Amended by Act n. 438, 2001 (Decreto-Legge 18 ottobre 2001, N. 374 coordinato 
con la Legge di Conversione 15 December 2001, n. 438 (Disposizioni urgenti per 
contastare il terrorismo internazionale). See <www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi>. For 
comments infra: L. Filippi, ‘Terrorismo internazionale: le nuove norme interne di 
prevenzione en repressione’ (2002) 2 Diritto Penale en Processo 163; V. Patanè, 
‘Recent Italian Efforts to Respond to Terrorism at the Legislative Level’ (2006) 4 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1166; Italian Contribution to the NCTb 
(National Coordinator for Counterterrorism) Counterterrorism Project, Research 
and Documentation Centre (WODC), Università degli Studi di Trento – Università 
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano (Milan, January 2006) at 24. 
15
 Art. 270 sexies (Condotte con finalità di terrorismo). 
16
 Art. 270 quarter (Arruolamento con finalità di terrorismo anche internazionale).  
17
 Art. 270 quinquies (Addestramento ad attività con finalità di terrorismo anche 
internazionale). 
18
  Art. 13 Act n. 155, 2005 (Nuove disposizioni in materia di arresto e di fermo). 
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some legal constraints on recording confidential communication and 
gathering information have been removed.19 Such information is gathered for 
preventive purposes: namely, information thus obtained may be used only 
for the purposes of investigation and not at the trial itself. The basis is vague: 
‘when it is indispensable for the prevention of terrorist activities’. The 
authority can be exercised for 40 days and can constantly be extended by 20 
days: indefinitely therefore, in theory. 
    
3.2.2 Germany 
 
Germany also has past experience with counterterrorism. In the 1960s and 
1970s, it was engaged in a fight against the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF). 
Several far-reaching counterterrorism laws were passed.20 The most well-
known and controversial measure from that period is the 
Kontaktsperregesetz,21 which made it possible to detain RAF suspects in 
complete isolation and seriously limited their right to legal assistance.22 
Eight days after the attacks on the WTC in New York, the German 
government presented a set of counterterrorism measures to Parliament.23 
This legislative initiative can be understood against the background of the 
discovery/ascertainment that three of the four Arabian hijackers lived in 
Hamburg and had planned the attack on the WTC there. The definition of the 
crime 'membership of a terrorist organisation' was expanded and was also 
declared applicable to foreign/international terrorism24 and the right of 
association was restricted.25 In a second set of measures, the security 
services were given wider powers, immigration laws were tightened, and the 
exchange of information and storage of data was facilitated.26 While no new 
criminal provisions or powers were created, an old investigation method 
                                                     
19
 Art. 226 (Intercettazioni telefonische preventive). 
20
 Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Ersten Gesetzes zur Reform des Strafverfahrensrechts 
vom 20. Dezember 1974, BGBl. 1974 I, 3686; Gesetz zur Änderung des 
Strafgezetzbuches, des Strafprozessordnung, des Gerichtsverfassungsgesetzes, des 
Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung und des Strafvollzugsgesetzes vom 18 August 1976, 
BGBl. 1976 I, 2181; Gesetz zur Änderung der Strafprozessordnung vom 14 April 
1978, BGBl. 1978 I, 497. 
21
 30 September 1977 (BGBl. I S 1877). 
22
 The BVerfasG ruled that the Act was constitutional, 1 August 1978, BVerfG 49, 
24. 
23
 Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz (TBG), 9 January 2002, BGBl. I, 2002 at 361. 
24
 Vierunddreißigstes Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz - § 129b StGB vom 22. August 
2002, BGBl. 2002 I, 3390. 
25
 Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Verinsgesetzes vom 14. Dezember 2001, BGBl. 
2001 I, 3319. 
26
 Terrorismusbekämpfungsergänzungsgesetz (TBEG), 5 January 2007, BGBl. I, 
2007 at 78.  
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from the RAF period was dusted off and reintroduced: the ‘Raster-
fahndung’.27 ‘Rasterfahndung’ is the method of searching the files of banks, 
libraries, universities, benefit agencies, and airline companies, without 
criminal suspicion, for the purpose of using a certain profile or specific 
characteristics to trace and keep an eye on suspect persons or dormant cells.  
  
3.2.3 The United Kingdom 
 
Britain has ample experience with fighting terrorism on its own territory. 
The fight against the IRA dates from 1922 and since that time different 
measures have been adopted, both criminal and non-criminal. Emergency 
legislation in those years made internment and preventive detention 
possible.28 This line has been further pursued since 9/11. For instance, the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ACTSA) 200129 provides for the 
administrative detention of foreign terrorism suspects against whom there is 
insufficient evidence to involve them in criminal proceedings.30 In 2004, the 
House of Lords ruled that the detention order was in conflict with the right to 
liberty and the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds that the measure 
affects only non-nationals.31 The successor to the ACTSA, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005,32 provides for house arrest or ‘control orders’ 
instead of detention.33 Breach of the conditions under which a control order 
                                                     
27
 For a critical review, see for example R. Gössner, ‘Computergestürtzter 
Generalverdacht. Die Rasterfahndung nach “Schläfern” halten einer bürgerrecht-
lingen Überprüfung kaum Stand’ (2002) 41 Vorgänge 41. 
28
 For a good overview see Clive Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-terrorism 
legislation (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002). 
29
 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 	

14 December 2001) 
available at <www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts>. See H. Fenwick, ‘Legislation: The Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11 
September?’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 724. 
30
 Part 4 (Immigration and Asylum – Suspected international terrorists), section 23 
(Detention). 
31
 A(FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Respondent), 16 December 2004, [2004] UKHL 56. 
32
 The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005 (11 March 2005) available at 
<www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts>. 
33
 The Act provides for two types: a control order that restricts the right to liberty 
and a control order that  violates the right to liberty (section 1(10)(a) PTA 2005). In 
the latter case, this is a ‘derogating control order’, an order that, on the basis of 
Article 15 ECHR derogates from the rights guaranteed by the ECHR because an 
emergency situation exists. A ‘derogating control order’ can be imposed by a court 
at the request of a Minister if ‘on the balance of probabilities’ (the civil standard of 
proof) a suspect is involved in terrorism-related activities (section 4(7)(A) PTA 
2005). 
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is imposed is a criminal offence.34 The bomb attacks in London in 2005 were 
the trigger for the adoption of the Terrorism Act (TA) 2006.35 The Act 
introduced several new crimes: for example, inciting and preparing 
terrorism, distributing terrorist writings, training terrorists, and merely being 
present at places where terrorists are trained.36 In criminalising terrorism, the 
legislature has made use of reverse onus provisions, a legislative technique 
that dates back to the ‘Diplock report’37 and antiterrorism legislation in 
Northern Ireland.38 Procedural measures in the TA 2006 pertain to the 
extension of ‘detention without charge’ from 14 to 28 days.39 The original 
Bill went further and provided for 90 days detention. Blair defended the 90-
day rule in the House of Commons by arguing that the police and judicial 
authorities need more time to gather incriminating evidence against terrorism 
suspects in order to prepare for a trial. He did not win the desired support. 
This episode will go down in history as Blair's first defeat in the House of 
Commons. His successor Gordon Brown won the approval of the House of 
Commons for an extension to 42 days, but was defeated in the House of 
Lords.40   
 
3.2.4 United States 
 
The most talked about counterterrorism legislation is undoubtedly that of the 
US. From 2001, the Bush administration – which ended in January 2009 –  
pursued a policy characterised by the expansion of executive powers and the 
marginalisation of civil rights and liberties. The USA PATRIOT ACT 2001, 
a framework act in which a large number of laws are amended, contains a 
definition of terrorism on American territory41 and provides for the 
criminalisation of harbouring terrorists and providing ‘material support’ to 
                                                     
34
 Section 9 PTA 2005. For a critical discussion, see L. Zedner, ‘Preventive Justice 
or Pre-Punishment? The Case of Control Orders’ (2007) 60 Current Legal Problems 
174. 
35
 The Terrorism Act (TA) 2006 30 March 2006) available at <www.opsi.gov.uk/ 
Acts>. 
36
 Sections 1, 5, 2, 6 and 8, respectively, of the TA 2006. 
37
 Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist 
activities in Northern Ireland, Cmnd. 5185, London, 1972. 
38
 Section 7 Emergency Powers Act  1973. 
39
 Section 23(7) TA 2006. 
40
 On 14 October 2008, with 309 against 118 votes. See ‘Falconer leads assault on 
42-day plan’ available at <www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/oct/14/terrorism-
uksecurity1>.  
41
 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), H.R. 3162, October 24, 
2001, Section 802 (a): Domestic Terrorism Defined - Section 2331 Title 18, United 
States Code.  
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terrorism.42 Other measures are for the purpose of widening the powers of 
the security services, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the CIA, 
including wiretapping and tracing number data.43 A commotion arose in 
2004 when telecom companies were revealed to have given security services 
access to all their number data by order of the President and without court 
intervention, thereby allowing anyone and everyone to be wiretapped by 
these services. A law was recently passed providing for a prior judicial 
review, albeit a limited one. The most controversial measure is the detention 
of ‘enemy combatants’ at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. These persons are 
detained on the basis of the laws of war, though only a few have been 
prosecuted. Criminal prosecution takes place before a military commission.44 
The rules of procedure and evidence of military commissions differ from 
those of regular criminal proceedings and courts martial. The prohibition on 
using pressure in interrogating suspects has been qualified; evidence 
obtained under pressure may be used under certain circumstances.45 The 
rules of evidence have also been eased: anonymous and hearsay evidence 
from witnesses is admissible. The burden of proof is on the accused to show 
that such evidence is unreliable or has no ‘probative value’.46 The accused 
has no right to ‘disclosure’ of information that could jeopardise national 
security. The military commission judge may nevertheless order that a 
summary of such information be disclosed to the accused.47 
 
3.2.5 Characteristics of counterterrorism legislation 
 
From the survey of measures in the Netherlands and elsewhere I have 
derived several characteristics of counterterrorism legislation: 
Firstly, criminalisation in the early preliminary stage, or to use the 
German term: Vorfeldkriminalisierung. This occurs in all the countries 
studied. Criminalisation in the preliminary stage is made permissible in 
different ways: in an ‘external’ objective way, by criminalising certain acts 
of endangerment, and in an ‘internal’ subjective way by criminalising the 
                                                     
42
 USA PATRIOT Act, H.R. 3162, 24 October 2001, Section 805 (a) In general, see 
Section 2339A of Title 18, Unites States Code. 
43
 USA PATRIOT Act, H.R. 3162, 24 October 2001, sections 201-225. 
44
 An Act to authorise trial by military commission for violations of the law of war, 
and for other purposes (‘Military Commissions Act 2006), H.R. 3930, 3 January 
2006. 
45
 Military Commission Act 2006, § 948 r (Compulsory self-incrimination 
prohibited; treatment of statements obtained by torture and other statements) sub c 
(Statements obtained before enactment of Detainee Treatment Act 2005) and sub d 
(Statements obtained after enactment of Detainee Treatment Act 2005).  
46
 Military Commissions Act, § 949a (Rules) (E) (ii). 
47
 Military Commissions Act, § 949j (c) (Protection of Classified Information)(B). 
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purpose for which a certain action is performed.48 In the UK, criminalisation 
at the preliminary stage is based on the objective model; these are crimes of 
endangerment. The Netherlands has chosen to focus on the terrorist purpose 
and has therefore adopted a subjective criminalisation model; 
Secondly, a broadening of investigative powers. The lower threshold 
of ‘indications’ in the Netherlands is one example. In Italy, the threshold that 
triggers the application of investigative powers has even been completely 
separated from an actual offence. Confidential communication can be 
recorded if it is ‘indispensable for the prevention of terrorist activities’ 
‘Rasterfahndung’ in Germany goes just as far. 49 Without criminal suspicion, 
files of banks, libraries, and universities can be searched in order to use a 
certain profile to trace dormant cells;  
Thirdly, an expansion of the permissibility of pre-trial detention. 
This is already possible in the Netherlands on the basis of an ‘ordinary’ 
suspicion. In the UK the possibility of detention without charge has been 
extended, as likewise in Italy, where five days' preventive detention is 
permissible without an actual suspicion, during which time the detainee can 
be examined without the assistance of a lawyer;50 
Fourthly, the use of non-criminal measures to achieve a similar 
repressive effect. This practice is best illustrated by the detention of ‘enemy 
combatants’ at Guantánamo Bay. The British practice of control orders also 
falls under this heading; they are effectively a type of house arrest. The 
sanction lists can also be defined as quasi-criminal on grounds of their 
punitive effect. It is worth noting that in several of these measures, criminal 
law is ‘smuggled in’ through the back door. Violation of a control order is a 
criminal offence, as is participation in an organisation on a sanction list.  
From these four characteristics of anti-terrorism legislation it is not 
hard to draw the overall conclusion that these measures are all centred on the 
notion of ‘prevention’.  
 
 
                                                     
48
 A subjective approach has been chosen in the Netherlands. Stamhuis regrets this 
and argues that it would have been more logical for the legislature to criminalise 
terrorist crimes and conspiracy, just like the other crimes of endangerment in the 
Dutch Penal Code, by using the objective model. E.F. Stamhuis, Gemeen gevaar 
(Nijmegen: WLP 2006) at 21. 
49
 Art. 226(1) Codice di Procedure Penale: ‘… quando siano ritenute idispensabili 
per la prevenzione di attività terroristiche …’.   
50
  Art. 13 Act n. 155, 2005 (Nuove disposizioni in materia di arresto e di fermo). 
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4 Prevention as the point of departure for criminal legislation 
 
4.1 The precautionary principle 
 
The precautionary principle was developed mainly in areas of law aimed at 
protection of the environment and public health.51 Generally speaking, the 
precautionary principle entails that if and when a threat of serious or 
irreparable harm arises, a lack of scientific certainty cannot apply as a reason 
not to take or to postpone preventive measures. Such uncertainty relates to 
the occurrence of the harm. The precautionary principle prevents taking 
action only when it has been sufficiently or irrefutably established that harm 
will occur or has already occurred. In that case, it may no longer be possible 
to take effective measures to remedy the harm, while imposing an obligation 
to pay compensation can also be a complex matter: for example, because of 
a multi-causal connection. The precautionary principle can be used in 
different gradations of ‘mandatoriness’.52 In the formulation used above, the 
principle is still reasonably weak. It states only that a lack of conclusive 
evidence in itself does not prohibit the taking of measures.53 This does not 
mean that the lack of such evidence may no longer play a part in the 
decision-making process, which actually centres on the question of how 
much risk one is willing to bear, given the scientific uncertainty regarding 
the harm. 
 In a much stricter variant, the precautionary principle can be viewed 
as the obligation to use a safety margin at all times in the decision-making 
process. This gives rise to a normative action principle: if serious or 
irreversible harm can occur, action – taking precautionary measures – is 
mandatory. In that formulation, there is room for inaction only if it has been 
irrefutably established that no harm will occur. But because of the 
uncertainty regarding the occurrence of the harm, inaction is in fact no 
option.54 We do not consider the extent to which this mandatory formulation 
of the precautionary principle is actually professed in relation to 
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 The precautionary principle and ‘the principle of preventive action’ are referred 
to, for example in Art. 174 EC Treaty.  
52
 The following interpretation of the precautionary principle is taken from Sunstein, 
above n. 9, at 18. For a summary of the literature about the precautionary principle, 
see Pieterman, above n. 4, at 37. 
53
 To this extent, the precautionary principle relates to ‘… regulating the reasons for 
a decision and the basis for action.’ See L. Fisher, ‘Book review: Cass Sunstein, 
Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005’ (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 288. 
54
 It is doubtful as well whether science can produce conclusive proof that there is no 
relationship between activity and harm. The results of a study can never be anything 
but that this study does not show any relationship. The reverse is also true: research 
showing that a relationship does exist can always be falsified by later research. 
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environmental protection and public health.55 It is noteworthy that this action 
logic seems characteristic of the risk society; based on a feeling of threat of 
risks, the central idea is that one must remain a step ahead of danger and 
subsequently take preventive measures, even if it is not certain whether the 
feared risk/danger will actually materialise. In view of this parallel, it is 
interesting to look at possible criticism in relation to the strict variant of the 
precautionary principle. 
 
4.2 Criticism of the precautionary principle 
 
In his book, Laws of Fear, Sunstein summarises such criticism very 
concisely. He states: ‘The principle [the strict formulation of the 
precautionary principle; MJB/EvS] threatens to be paralyzing, forbidding 
regulation, inaction, and every step in between’.56 If the risk of harm gives 
reason to take precautionary measures, it should be realised that taking those 
measures in itself gives rise to a risk of different harm. If drinking water 
contains a certain substance that can eventually result in serious damage to 
health, the precautionary principle compels the taking of measures in the 
form of purification of the water to remove this substance. Nevertheless, the 
purification method may involve certain disadvantages (e.g. high cost), with 
the result that people will use alternative sources of water. Yet, these 
alternative measures can entail other potential risks for users.57 The 
precautionary principle then compels the taking of precautionary measures 
again, but this could result in a reversal of the measures first taken. Viewed 
in this way, the precautionary principle can as a rule function if the 
precautionary measures taken do not have any or only minor negative 
effects. But that is an ideal situation that will not occur readily in practice. It 
will almost always be possible to indicate loss items resulting from the 
taking of precautionary measures, even if these are just the costs of taking 
the measures themselves or missing out on certain benefits. 
 To allow the precautionary principle to function in practice, 
preferences must be expressed or, as Sunstein puts it somewhat more 
critically, one must put blinders on. It must be determined in advance which 
interests at risk are to be protected and which can be ignored. Only if one is 
willing to protect certain interests and to give up others – which will 
predetermine the result of the weighing of interests – can the precautionary 
principle function in its strict interpretation. Sunstein points out in this 
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 Fisher, above n. 53, at 290, reproaches Sunstein for criticising an interpretation of 
the precautionary principle that is hardly professed. In practice, mainly the ‘weak’ 
version of that principle is said to be used.  
56
 Sunstein, above n. 9, at 13; see also C.R. Sunstein, Worst-case Scenarios 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 2007) at 123. 
57
 For this and other examples, see Sunstein, above n. 9, at 32. 
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context that, where dealing with risks is concerned, it is very easy for people 
to put on blinders unconsciously. He indicates several social-psychological 
mechanisms for this, which explain that people pay selective attention to 
risks. We mention three of these mechanisms, without developing them 
further.58 People, for instance, pay attention to the risks they see or that are 
forced on them in some way or other, while simply overlooking other, 
perhaps greater risks. In addition, people tend to look mainly at the risk that 
will manifest itself in the worst-case scenario, even if the chance that this 
scenario will manifest itself is highly unlikely. Lastly, the systematic 
connection between risks – the fact that preventive action can create new 
risks – is usually ignored. 
From these considerations – the paralysing effect on decision-
making and people’s unconscious selectivity in dealing with risks – Sunstein 
draws the conclusion that the precautionary principle should be rejected as a 
normative principle for action. Preventive action should not be taken 
automatically if the possibility exists that it will cause serious or irreversible 
harm. If preventive action is taken, it should be based on a weighing of all 
interests: that is, all costs and benefits involved in the preventive action. It 
will usually be hard to map the costs and benefits and to express or quantify 
them in such a way that they can actually be weighed. But that does not 
relieve us of the obligation to weigh all pros and cons of preventive action 
before taking it.  
 
4.3 From precautionary principle to anti-catastrophe principle 
 
Sunstein’s argument does not conclude with the above-mentioned criticism 
of the strict formulation of the precautionary principle. Because, 
notwithstanding that criticism, Sunstein recognises that this principle does 
indeed play a certain part in situations in which there is a threat of a large, 
wide-ranging disaster, while the probability of that disaster occurring cannot 
be determined. Even if there is little chance that the disaster will occur, if it 
did occur, the damage would be incalculable. In such a situation, the 
insistence on taking precautionary measures would be great. Sunstein 
introduces a decision rule for choosing these precautionary measures, in the 
form of the anti-catastrophe principle. This principle entails that the worst 
possible scenario is to be considered, and that preventive measures are taken 
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 This concerns availability heuristics, probability neglect and system neglect. 
Sunstein also refers to loss aversion (people vote conservatively and are therefore 
risk averse) and a belief in the benevolence of nature. See, with further references to 
the literature, Sunstein, above n. 9, at 35, and Sunstein, above n. 56, at 17.  Cf. 
further V.V. Ramraj, ‘Terrorism, risk perception and judicial review’ in V.V. 
Ramraj and others.(eds.), Global anti-terrorism law and policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2005) at 107. 
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to prevent that scenario. The catastrophe principle is therefore an application 
of the maximin rule: one chooses to maximise the minimum position.59 
Taking precautionary measures only avoids the worst conceivable position. 
Sunstein sets several preconditions for applying the anti-catastrophe 
principle. Summarised briefly, these come down to the fact that (i) the 
probability of the occurrence of the disaster (even if that probability cannot 
be determined accurately) should not be so small that all costs – 
disadvantages and risks – attached to taking precautionary measures are 
accurately mapped out, (ii) that the total costs of the precautionary measures 
cannot be huge, (iii) that the burdens involved in the precautionary measures 
cannot be placed unilaterally on specific minority groups and (iv) that in 
spending the available funds, one should not lose sight of perhaps more 
pressing social problems.60 
If one considers the formulation of the anti-catastrophe principle and 
the preconditions attached to it, it should be clear that Sunstein does not 
provide a tight decision-making schedule for taking or not taking 
precautionary measures to avoid a disastrous catastrophe.61 The formulation 
is too open for this. What constitutes a major wide-ranging catastrophe? 
How much material and immaterial damage can be expected? And with the 
first precondition in mind, how does one estimate that the chance the 
catastrophe will occur is small or very small, given the point of departure 
that the probability cannot be determined?  
If we understand Sunstein well, the anti-catastrophe principle 
appears to be based on two considerations. First of all, the realisation that it 
is perfectly normal for a society to take precautions when the dominant 
perception is that a catastrophe threatens.62 Everyone is at liberty to question 
the correctness of the perception,63 but that does not affect the fact that once 
the dominant perception that the society will be faced with a major 
                                                     
59
 The maximin rule comes from decision theory. In legal literature, attention is paid 
to this rule in, for example, John Rawls. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1999, revised edition) at 133: ‘The maximin rule tells us to 
rank alternatives by their worst possible outcomes: we are to adopt the alternative, 
the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others.’ The 
maximin rule can also be related to Beck’s risk society. See Beck, above n. 1, at 49: 
‘Basically, one is no longer concerned with attaining something “good”, but rather 
with preventing the worst; self-limitation is the goal that emerges. (…) The utopia of 
the risk society is that everyone should be spared from poisoning’. 
60
 Sunstein, above n. 9, at 109. See also Sunstein, above n. 56, at 135. 
61
 This is also the tenor of Fisher’s criticism, above n. 53, at 291. 
62
 According to Sunstein, the anti-catastrophe principle takes ‘a definitive place in 
both life and law’. See Sunstein, above n. 9, at 114. 
63
 Such criticism will usually have an effect only if one can demonstrate that the fear 
is unrealistic: namely, that the chance the catastrophe will occur is negligibly small. 
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catastrophe has been established, action will be taken.64 The second 
consideration comes down to the fact that in seeking appropriate 
precautionary measures, one must observe a certain degree of common sense 
and not take arbitrary measures. One should ensure that the precautionary 
measures are effective and do not themselves become a catastrophe. 
Considered in this way, Sunstein argues in favour of realistic and sensible 
decision-making with regard to the preventive approach to threatening 
catastrophes. 
 
4.4 From anti-catastrophe principle to fighting terrorism under criminal 
law 
 
The threat of terrorism today is considered realistic. While considerable 
debate exists in scholarly writing about the characteristics of modern 
terrorism and the threat emanating from it, the existing perception of risk is 
not strongly disputed.65 This would be difficult to do because the threat 
analyses are often based on confidential information from intelligence and 
security services. Indeed, the lack of transparency does not affect the 
perception of a threat. On the contrary, it seems to contribute to the elusive 
nature of the risk, which strengthens rather than reduces the feeling of the 
threat. Anyone familiar with the politics of counterterrorism, with the 
endless pile of policy documents and literature on the threat of terrorism, 
knows it is inevitable to accept that in modern times considerable value is 
placed on taking preventive measures in the fight against terrorism, also in 
relation to criminal law.66 The perceived threat of catastrophic terrorism 
largely dictates the taking of precautionary measures by the government.67 
The field of counterterrorism is not about a ‘traditional’ form of prevention 
in the sense of an objectifiable and knowable risk, but about potentially  
                                                     
64
 Cf. also B. van Klink, ‘Der Mythos der verlorenen Unschuld. Gewalt und 
Gewaltbekämpfung in den Niederlanden’ (2005) The Tilburg Working Paper Series 
on Jurisprudence and Legal History No. 04/2005 at 2 <www.uvt.nl/eer/papers/ 
WP05-04.pdf> (accessed 1 November 2008) which in this context mentions a duty 
of the State to ‘do something abut the feelings of insecurity existing in society, and 
Dershowitz, above n. 6, at 38, who relies on human nature.  
65
 For a brief survey, see G. Mythen and S. Walklate, ‘Communicating the terrorist 
risk: Harnessing a culture of fear?’ (2006) 2 Crime, Media, Culture 123 at 125. 
66
 Cf. also in this sense W. Hassemer, ‘Sicherheit durch Strafrecht’ (2006) 
Strafverteidiger 321 at 329. 
67
 Cf. Beck, above n. 1, at 24: ‘Risk society is a catastrophic society. In it the 
exceptional condition threatens to become the norm.’ Cf. further Ramraj, above n. 
58, at 113. 
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disastrous harm. This is exactly why far-reaching precautionary measures 
have been taken.68 
 This outline makes it clear that the political perception of the threat 
of terrorist attacks can be captured effortlessly in the preconditions of 
Sunstein’s anti-catastrophe principle: there is a threat of a large, wide-
ranging disaster, while the probability of that disaster occurring cannot be 
determined. It is, of course, quite possible to question the classification of 
terrorism as a catastrophic risk. In our opinion, however, it is not at all 
unreasonable to consider terrorism a catastrophe.69 This does not hold as 
much because each terrorist attack needs to be considered a catastrophe in 
itself, and it is quite possible that an actual terrorist attack will result in little 
damage. But one must not lose sight of the fact that terrorist attacks are 
committed precisely with the intention ‘to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain 
from doing any act’.70 When terrorist actions succeed in realising this 
intention, the consequences for the stability of democratic societies are far-
reaching. In our opinion, it is therefore quite possible to place the taking of 
counterterrorism measures in the key of the anti-catastrophe principle. It 
should be noted that this in itself does not justify those measures.  
 The conclusion is often drawn that the foregoing consideration of 
the precautionary principle and the anti-catastrophe principle provide 
viewpoints useful in assessing the desirability of and need for the criminal 
measures in the fight against terrorism outlined in Section 3.71 First of all, we 
are reminded by the fact that when the desirability or necessity of taking 
precautionary measures is an issue, it is inevitable that the decision-making 
will be based on preferences. If this were not the case, there would be a risk 
of paralysing the decision-making process. One should know what one wants 
to preserve or protect as well as what one is willing to sacrifice. For two 
obvious reasons, the clarity of the debate is served by expressing these 
preferences in exact terms. The first reason is that a debate based on general 
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 Cf. C. Aradau and R. van Munster, ‘Taming the Future: the dispositive of risk in 
the war on terror’ in L. Amore and M. de Goede (eds.), Risk and the War on Terror 
(London, New York: Routledge 2008) at 23; Pieterman, above n. 4, at 37, 83 and 
174; M. Schuilenburg, ‘De paradox van het voorzorgsbeginsel. Over “unk-unk” en 
uitsluiting’ in D. Siegel and others (eds.), Culture criminologie (Den Haag: Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers, 2008, forthcoming). 
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 Sunstein relates the anti-catastrophe principle himself somewhat casually to 
counterterrorism. See Sunstein, above n. 9, at 114. 
70
 See article 2 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism (1999). 
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 The viewpoints referred to here can be found in different words also in M. 
Valverde, ‘Governing Security, Governing Through Security’ in R.J. Daniels and 
others (eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2002) at 84. 
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notions does not make it sufficiently clear what exactly should be prevented, 
which makes it impossible to determine what measures would have to be 
taken. This is illustrated by the debate over the introduction of a fundamental 
right to safety. Such a fundamental right does not mean anything as long as 
nothing is said about what ‘safety’ means. When one studies arguments 
carefully for the introduction of such a fundamental right, it usually becomes 
clear that they are backed by specific arguments: for example, dissatisfaction 
with the emphasis placed on protecting the rights of the accused. By 
expressing this in veiled terms, one blocks an open debate over the 
preferences to be made. This touches on the second reason to formulate the 
preferences clearly. The preference to be made largely determines which 
precautionary measures can be considered acceptable or not. The focus of 
the debate should therefore be on preferences.  
 The second viewpoint is the requisite indication of the costs and 
benefits of taking precautionary measures. This of course is an open door; 
careful decision-making is always based on weighing the pros and cons. 
Still, it is good to emphasise it with regard to precautionary measures. The 
cost-benefit analysis is in a certain sense a counterpart of making 
preferences. The precautionary measures taken are dictated to a great extent 
by the preferences made. But by subsequently mapping out precisely all 
costs and benefits of the measures to be taken, one can estimate whether the 
precautionary measures will also provide the expected solution.72 We 
emphasise in this regard that, certainly when the anti-catastrophe principle is 
involved in a legal context, one should not take the terms ‘costs’ and 
‘benefits’ too literally. The point is that the disadvantages (the costs) and the 
advantages (benefits) should be examined. This cannot be called a literal 
weighing of costs and benefits in the sense of an arithmetical addition or 
subtraction. That would imply that one could attribute an arithmetical weight 
to the advantages and disadvantages to determine whether a positive or 
negative final balance remains. This does not diminish the fact that interests 
are often weighed in law, which requires a view of all interests at stake when 
a certain decision is made. The point is that the pros and cons can be taken 
into consideration and be the subject of debate before the decision is made to 
take precautionary measures. This impetus is not only intended for those 
who argue in favour of taking precautionary measures. Opponents should 
also realise that costs are involved in not taking precautionary measures, 
which should not only be compared to the benefits of not taking the 
measures but also related to the costs and benefits of taking preventive 
measures. In short, the argumentation must be complete 
 Both these viewpoints are important for the area from which the 
following examples have been taken – the fight against terrorism under 
criminal law – an area in which Sunstein’s catastrophe principle plays an 
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important part. It is especially important to assess the measures to be taken 
in a matter-of-fact and businesslike manner. Cost-benefit analyses are 
important for this, not so much in a quantitative sense but rather in the sense 
of taking stock of the pros and cons, viewed from practically or 
fundamentally different viewpoints. Such analysis can to a certain extent 
prevent one from being too easily tempted to take ineffective or even 
counterproductive measures. 
 
 
5 Viewpoints with regard to a further assessment of the measures taken 
 
5.1 Further development 
 
The observation that a rational and businesslike assessment is necessary – 
based on taking into account the pros and cons – naturally cannot suffice, 
because the question of how to give specific shape to that assessment arises. 
No all-encompassing scheme can be given for that, but several relevant 
viewpoints and angles of approach can be explained. These viewpoints and 
angles of approach relate first of all to the way in which the knowledge 
needed to make that matter-of-fact and businesslike assessment can be 
gathered, and also to the organisation of the legal debate. As we have already 
noted in Section 2, we are concerned with the manner of assessment and not 
its outcome. For this reason – but also because of the prohibitive length of 
this paper – we refrain from making a further general evaluation of specific 
components of the current counterterrorism policy. 
 
5.2 Acquiring the necessary knowledge 
 
An important task for criminal law research is first of all to bear in mind 
what one does not know and therefore formulate where the gaps in 
knowledge can be found and what their consequences are. Characteristic of 
the debate on the role of criminal law in fighting terrorism is that there is no 
good insight into the threat situation that is the basis of all sorts of measures. 
The bottleneck connected with this – a good assessment of the need for the 
measures is not possible without specific threat analysis – has been 
identified, but it usually does not go beyond that. This resignation may arise 
from the realisation that it is characteristic of a terrorist threat to be 
unpredictable in nature, regarding both the chance that an attack will take 
place and the form in which that can or will happen. The political drive to 
act is rather the fear that the consequences of an attack will be catastrophic. 
The question is whether criminal law researchers should leave it at that. 
There are increasingly more calls for horizon legislation – such legislation 
already exists in part in some countries – and those pleas can be well 
founded scientifically on the basis of the inscrutability of the threat of 
  
 
 
2009]  The meaning of the precautionary principle 191 
 
 
terrorist attacks.73 Along that line, one can also seek new guarantees with a 
view to ‘unguided’ prosecutorial action, such as the development of rules for 
compensation. A step further would be to study, in cooperation with 
researchers from other disciplines, the extent to which more specific threat 
situations can be formulated. Such research is not without its complications, 
but it is surely worth the trouble to try. 
 The foregoing indicates that precisely the need to gain a better 
insight into the effectiveness of government measures compel us to engage 
in more multidisciplinary research. In relation to counterterrorism, the 
question frequently arises as to whether the new penalisations and 
prosecution powers have the intended effect, or whether perhaps the opposite 
effect is achieved.74 An attempt can be made to gather more information 
about the availability of alternative, less far-reaching measures. For instance, 
with regard to penalising ‘recruitment’ or ‘training’ of potential terrorists, 
knowledge of the social and psychological characteristics of radicalisation 
processes can presumably shed more light on the usefulness of the 
prosecution of recruiters, partly in connection with other, non-criminal 
interventions in those processes.75 Such knowledge contributes at any rate to 
a wise prosecution policy. 
 
5.3 The legal debate 
 
Suppose that one has all the relevant information about all the interests 
involved, or that one accepts that a consideration is based on a limited 
number of identified and listed interests. This is a crucial step in law, 
because preferences – or formulated more negatively: blinders – will then 
start playing a part. Attributing weight to interests largely determines the 
result of the weighing. This is inevitable. Here, too, the most important thing 
is to be aware that the preferences actually determine the choice. It is 
desirable as well to explain as far as possible the criteria on the basis of 
which the choice is determined, because the extent to which this explanation 
is possible is subject to limitations. What we call ‘meta-criteria’ are usually 
set, and are intended as guidelines for allowing far-reaching forms of 
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 Cf. more generally Pieterman, above n. 4, at 38 and 196 on the periodic 
reconsideration of precautionary measures. 
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 On the importance of striving for evidence based solutions, see Valverde, above n. 
71, at 88. For a survey of the relatively little knowledge about the effectiveness of 
some counterterrorist measures, see C. Lum and others, The Effectiveness of 
Counter-Terrorism Strategies: A Campbell Systematic Review (2006) available at 
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Psychology of terrorism: coping with the continuing threat (Westport, London: 
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criminal-related government action or not. Much is written about this in 
relation to counterterrorism. A certain consensus seems to have been reached 
on the applicable meta-criteria. Often mentioned in this context are the 
requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity, the importance of a 
thorough threat analysis, a well-founded expectation that the proposed 
measures will be effective, respect for fundamental human rights and 
principles, and access to the courts.76 
 The application of such meta-criteria in making assessments is 
undoubtedly useful, because it gives more insight into the reasons that 
certain choices are made. At the same time, these meta-criteria are abstract 
in nature, which enables both proponents and opponents to rely on the same 
criteria. For instance, legislators frequently argue that terrorism legislation is 
closely in line with the existing criminal law and prosecution system – and 
therefore meets the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity – 
whereas scholars/criminal law commentators argue that important starting 
points of that system are under review, and that such legislation therefore 
does not meet the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity. This does 
not mean that the aforementioned meta-criteria are worthless, but it is 
difficult to ‘operationalise’ them. In our view, therefore, a criminal law 
scholar should not get caught up in relying on meta-criteria. The remarks 
that follow relate to this. 
 A researcher may be expected to look at the development of 
preventive criminal measures in the fight against terrorism from a certain 
distance, and therefore adopt a rational and somewhat detached approach. 
This does not mean that one cannot criticise legislative amendments creating 
anti-terrorism measures. Not at all. However, a rational analysis should 
precede the criticism. We should see to it that criticism does not become a 
reflex every time legislation is amended. Not every amendment necessarily 
implies deterioration; it may indicate the need to rethink certain starting 
points or principles. One example of a principle that can be seen to have 
changed over time, and which can be given new meaning – at least in 
continental (European) legal systems – is the presumption of innocence. As 
has been argued elsewhere, one can detect an erosion of the meaning of the 
presumption as a limiting principle with regard to pre-trial detention.77 This 
is partly because of societal developments that can be brought under the term 
‘risk society’ but more importantly by being superseded by the right to 
liberty and the normative framework that has been drawn up in that context. 
This development may trigger a change in the emphasis. Indeed it is argued 
that the presumption of innocence is a rule of evidence and decision-making: 
namely, a prohibition on wrongful convictions. This entails that (1) the 
                                                     
76
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accused person does not have to prove his/her innocence and that (2) a 
person may only be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. This ‘redefinition’ 
does not affect the rule of law character of the presumption of innocence. 
The point of departure is still the same: the state may not cause a person to 
suffer unless its right to do so has been demonstrated by law.  
 The above can be referred to as an attempt to keep an open mind in 
criminal law research with regard to a changed context and to look beyond 
the almost instinctive reaction to criticise and reject certain counterterrorism 
measures. An attempt to shift the emphasis of the presumption of innocence 
is also an attempt to bolster the principle in its latter capacity. As criminal 
law researchers, we may be well advised to find other ways to make 
ourselves heard when analysing and commenting upon new legislative 
proposals. Instead of debating with the legislature, criminal law researchers 
could debate more amongst themselves over the current meaning of criminal 
law starting points and principles and the need and possibilities to revise 
them. Numerous interesting, smaller research questions can emerge from 
such an approach. For example, as well as the question of what fundamental 
objections are attached to penalisations that are strongly embedded in the 
malicious intention of the person concerned, the question can be studied of 
how practical that actually is. It is one thing for the legislature to give that 
intention a central place in order to take criminal action at the earliest 
possible stage, but from a tactical point of view – think of gathering 
information about a possible terrorist network – disadvantages are also 
involved.78  
 Attention should also be paid to the fact that the legislature 
sometimes deliberately chooses to arrange things outside of criminal law, for 
the purpose of evading certain criminal law guarantees. The detention of 
enemy combatants at Guantánamo Bay is a very clear example of this, as is 
the blocking of bank balances of persons on the UN or EU sanction list.79 
Less radical, but not less controversial, is a Dutch bill to subject potential 
terrorists to area-related and personal obligations to report by way of 
administrative law. On closer analysis, from the legislature’s point of view 
there is always a certain room for choice concerning the ‘legislative 
complex’ within which shape is given to certain measures. This results in a 
dilemma for a criminal law researcher who participates in the debate about 
the way in which that room for choice is to be filled.  Should one accentuate 
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 Cf. the ‘Early Intervention Dilemma’, as outlined by R.M. Chesney, ‘Beyond 
Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism’ 
(2006) Wake Forest Legal Studies Research Paper Series. Research Paper No. 
932608 <ssrn.com/abstract=932608> (accessed 27 October 2006) at 11. 
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 More and different examples can be found in L. Amoore and M. de Goede, 
‘Governance, risk and dataveillance in the war on terror’ (2005) 43 Crime, Law & 
Social Change 149. 
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the criminal law guarantees and emphasise that the use of criminal law is 
subject to inherent limitations? In that case, the door to measures on the 
periphery of criminal law would be open wider. Or does one choose the 
position that criminal liability in the preliminary phase and the scope of 
prosecution powers can best be extended a bit further? Extending the 
criminal law playing field does, after all, have the advantage that the newly 
added elements will be integrated in the existing criminal law checks and 
balances. But in that case, one may throw the baby out with the bath water, 
because such integration will lower the level of legal protection to the level 
of the periphery of criminal law. Needless to say, this issue is not as black 
and white as we have outlined here. Here, too, it mainly concerns 
maintaining a balance. The main point is that, in our opinion, the emergence 
of preventive actions on the periphery of criminal law compels an open 
attitude to the possibilities of criminal law. Because what the aforementioned 
dilemma shows is that the position chosen on the role of criminal law does 
not stand alone, but can have consequences for what is happening on the 
periphery of criminal law. 
 One can criticise the options outlined for being too limited. It is 
conceivable that one chooses to reject criminal law as a ‘legislative complex’ 
within which antiterrorism measures can be taken and at the same time 
oppose the inclusion of such measures on the periphery of criminal law 
because of poor legal protection. There is nothing wrong with taking such a 
position, yet one must be aware of the political counterforce. The legislature 
seeks precisely the periphery of criminal law because different and in 
particular also fewer guarantees apply there than in criminal law. This may 
give rise to strategic questions. Should one completely reject the taking of 
measures on the periphery of criminal law because there is less legal 
protection compared to criminal law? Or should one make suggestions as to 
how legal protection can be provided for on the periphery of criminal law, 
without removing the distinction between alternative enforcement 
mechanisms and criminal law?80 This is a dilemma. We do not presume to 
have any ready-made answers, but consider that we can gain from opening 
up criminal law research to the awareness of these dilemmas and to include 
them in determining positions. 
 
 
6 In conclusion 
 
The risk society is a challenging point of view from which to study the 
developments in current criminal law, but it is not free of problems. The 
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outside the context of criminal law. The desirability of and possibilities for this are 
discussed extensively in Dershowitz, above n. 5.  
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concept ‘risk society’ can be used to explain certain developments in 
criminal law, particularly the increasing preventive use of criminal law. At 
the same time, the role of criminal law in the risk society gives rise to 
complex questions as to whether those developments are in keeping with the 
existing criminal law system. In this paper, we have explored the extent to 
which the precautionary principle can be helpful in assessing the emergence 
of preventive criminal law, in particular the fight against terrorism. Within 
the limitations outlined in this paper, it has proved possible to formulate 
some relevant viewpoints for a future research agenda. We are aware of the 
large knowledge gap with regard to making a good assessment of the 
measures taken. This should be an impetus to initiate more multidisciplinary 
research. Furthermore, criminal law researchers should take a rational and 
somewhat detached view with regard to antiterrorism legislation. Testing 
measures against ‘meta-criteria’ can produce reasonably predictable results. 
More interesting and challenging is the question of to what extent do 
fundamental principles of criminal law retain their value and meaning in the 
social context of, for instance, the risk society? And has their value changed 
over time? Our recommendations have produced no concrete results. At best 
they may be regarded as giving a sense of direction involving avenues of 
future criminal law research.   
 
